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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

R. M. BIRDZELL,

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 92127
UTAH OIL REFINING COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant brought this Action against the Respondent, his Summons having been filed on the 5th day of February,
1951. In August, 1936, the Respondent, Utah Oil Company,
made a lease to Mr. R. M. Birdzell, Appellant, all of the Respondent's Service Station property designated as Service Station No. 511 in Wendover, Utah, this lease being in reality
a sub-lease of said property inasmuch as the prop~rty in question
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is owned by the Western Pacific Railroad Company. For the
furtherance of their own company, the Respondents seek out
and make leases for the use of certain property belonging to
the Western Pacific Railroad Company for the purpose of
establishing outlets for their products on that ~and. Due to
the business organization of said Respondent, it has become
customary for that company to further provide leases to individuals, which leases grant said individuals the right to operate
Service Stations for the distribution of Respondent's products.
In August, 1936, the Respondent leased to Mr. Birdzell,
the Appellant, the property and holdings in Wen dover, Utah
designated as Station No. 511, upon a yearly basis, such leases
being perpetuated by an option of renewal to the Appellant
written into each lease. This arrangement continued with
each yearly lease being renewed until the end of 1947. At
this time, Respondent made known to the Appellant that the
original lease which they had from the Railroad Company
had expired in that year. That lease was to expire at the end
of 1947. Shortly prior to the end of 1947, Appellant became
anxious as to his further business prospects and made several
requests to the Respondent for a lease to be consummated.
After numerous discussions, personal and by telephone, it was
decided by the Appellant and the respondent that should the
Respondent Oil Company be successful in obtaining a renewal
of their lease with the 'Railroad Company, that they would
make a sub-lea~e of the unexpired term to Appellant. After
such oral agreement had been arrived at, a letter was written
by Mr. A. G. Olofson, representing Utah Oil Company to Mr.
R. M. Birdzell, Appellant, setting forth the terms of that
4
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agreement. This letter clearly sets forth the terms of the agreement which had been arrived at orally. It definitely established
the property interest in question by indicating that the lease
would be in the same terms as previous leases held between
Respondent and Appellant. The letter was signed by A. G.
Olofson, an authorized agent of the Respondent Oil Company,
the party sought to be charged in this action. This letter appears
in the trial brief as Appendix "B" (enclosure) of Appellant's
papers.
After receipt of said letter, Appellant continued in possession of said premises until the date of January 10, 1949, at
which time Respondent terminated Appellant's lease.
This action is sought by Appellant to recover damages
suffered by Appellant as a result of Respondent's breach of
the above mentioned agreement to make a lease with Appellant
for the remainder of the ten (10) year period of Respondent's
lease with the Railroad Company.
The case was brought to trial before a trial judge as was
stated above in February, 1951. After the filing of the preliminary papers which appear in the trial brief submitted
by the Clerk's office, the motion for a Summary Judgment was
made by the Respondent on the grounds that the oral agreement
between the parties above mentioned to make a lease was
within Section 33-5-3· of Utah Code, Annotated and that such
letter, as is marked Appendix "B" in the trial brief was not
sufficient memorandum to make such oral agreement comply
with the Statutes of Frauds. Upon consideration of Respondent's motion, the Court granted a Summary Judgment for the
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Respondent and against the Appellant for the cause above
stated. It is this point of law upon which Appellant relies in
this appeal.

POINTS INVOLVED
Did the Court rule correctly that the letter marked Appendix "B" in the trial brief was insufficient to constitute a
memorandum which would take an oral agreement to make a
lease out of the Statute of Frauds. We have concluded that.
the trial court erred in this ruling because:

ARGUMENTS
In accordance with our position in this matter, we first
draw the Court's attention to Section 33-5-3 of the Utah Code
Annotated which reads as follows:
"Every contract with a lease for a longer period than
one year or for the sale of any lands or any interest in
lands shall be void unless the contract, or some note
or memorandum is in writing subscribed by the party
to whom the. lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing."

·~

In explanation of the Statute indicating a note or memorandum will be sufficient if signed by the party to be charged,
several cases may be cited:
Dennison v. Hildt, 70 P. 2d 56, speaking generally says:
6
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"The Statute of Frauds is not a law relating to the
formality of the execution of contracts, but merely
requiring a memorandum as evidence of the contract."
In reliance on this case, we feel that certainly there is
an indication of the oral agreement set forth in the letter in
question. Further in this clarification we quote from Holsz v.
Stephen, 200 NE 601:
"A memorandum in writing is sufficient to meet the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds that certain contracts shall be evidenced by writing, if it contains the
names of the parties, the terms and conditions of the
contract and a description of the property sufficient
to render it capacable of identification."
Certainly here there would be no que~tion but that this
letter was signed by the party to be charged or the lawful agent
thereto, but it is further urged that the letter written by Respondent to Appellant sufficiently set forth the terms of the
oral agreement, it being seen that all the conditions for affecting the lease were set down in said letter. The letter also meets
the requirements of a description of the property or property
interest, the property interest in this case being the le~se for
a term of ten years. The letter marked Appendix "B" would
leave no doubt but that this was the lease referred to in said
letter. If it be argued that the lease itself was not the property
interest to be described, but that in reality it was the real
property itself, then certainly the description of the property,
being that of "our station No. 511 at Wendover, Utah" would
satisfy as description of the property in question.
Reading Axe v. Botts, 37 A 2d ~72:
7
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·'The prov~sion of the Statute of Frauds that contracts to create an interest in real estate shall be unenforceable unless they be in writing and signed by
the parties so making or creating the same, or their
agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, is
satisfied if the parties to be charged or the properly
authorized agents have executed a writing embodying
the terms of the agreement."
American Law Reports Annotated further bears out this
view in Volume 80, P 1475:
"It is settled not only by the, tacit assumption of
numerous cases discussed throughout this annotation,
but also by the cases which have expressly passed upon
the question, that the contract or the memorandum
thereof, required by the Statute to be in writing, need
not be a formal writing in the form of a regular contract, and that the agreement to employ or to pay
commissions, or the authorization to sell or purchase,
may be embodied in or deduced from correspondence,
letters, or telegrams exchanged between parties."

A Utah case which falls directly on point with the view
stated by the A. L. R. is Fritsch v. Hess, 49 Ut. 75:
"From an examination of the evidence in the case,
we find that the dealings between the plaintiff and the
defendant with reference to the employment of the
defendant as agent and with reference to the particular
sale claimed to have been made by the plaintiff for the
defendant were by correspondence, either by letters
transmitted by mail, or by messages transmitted by
telegraph. Throughout the dealings the plaintiff was
at Salt Lake City, in the State of Utah, and the defendant was in the State of California. We find that, so far
as the contract of employment between the plaintiff
8
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and defendant is concerned, these letters and telegrams
are sufficient to constitute 'some note or memorandum
thereof in writing subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith.' It is well settled that no particular form
of words is necessary to comply with this statute, and
that almost any kind of writing ·will be sufficient if
it be signed by the party sought to be charged and
contains the essential terms of a contnict."
In conclusion, may it be stated that the only point for
consideration here is whether or not the letter in question,
marked Appendix "B" in the trial brief is a sufficient memorandum to comply with the Statute of Frauds. This follows
from the decree of the trial court. Said court received the
motion for a Summary Judgment on the issue of said letter's
insufficiency and rendered its judgment in compliance with
that motion. We have attempted here to cite authority which
would substantiate our contention that this letter was in fact
a sufficient memorandum and such authority would indicate
that the trial court erred in rendering its Summary Judgment
on the basis of its insufficiency as a memorandum to comply
with the Statute of Frauds.

SHIELDS & SHIELDS,

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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